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Leak reveals China is exporting internet censorship technology

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  Published in Science and Technology on Thursday, September 11th 2025 at 7:07 GMT by The Globe and Mail
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China’s Quiet Export of Internet Censorship: What the New Leak Reveals

A trove of documents that has just come to light suggests that the Chinese government is actively exporting its sophisticated internet‑censorship apparatus to governments around the world. The leak, which was first reported by The Globe and Mail in a podcast recap on its “The Decibel” series, details how Beijing’s “Great Firewall” technology is being packaged and sold to a growing roster of authoritarian regimes – a move that has sparked fresh alarm in Washington, Ottawa, and the human‑rights community.

A “Global Weapon” on the Rise

At the heart of the leak is an internal memo from the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s 2022–2023 annual report to the President. The memo – long a confidential assessment of China’s cyber‑strategic capabilities – was obtained by journalists and released by The Globe and Mail in March. It describes a coordinated effort by the Chinese government to license and sell its censorship technology to overseas clients, with a particular focus on the “low‑to‑middle income” markets that are still consolidating internet infrastructure.

The memo lists more than 30 Chinese companies that are actively engaged in the export of filtering, surveillance, and monitoring tools. These include major tech giants like Tencent, iQIYI, and ByteDance, as well as smaller firms such as PTT, a Beijing‑based provider of deep‑packet inspection (DPI) hardware. The memo makes clear that the products are not only sold as commercial solutions for “content moderation” but are also configured for “state‑level” surveillance, enabling governments to identify, track, and silence political dissent.

Where the Technology Is Going

The leaked documents identify a handful of countries that have already purchased or are in advanced talks to acquire China’s censorship tech. Myanmar’s military junta, which has been tightening its grip on the internet since 2021, reportedly received a suite of DPI tools that allow it to block VPN traffic and filter keywords related to the opposition. Belarus, Russia’s neighbor, is also reported to have signed a contract for a “censorship as a service” package from a Chinese firm in 2023, designed to help the Lukashenko regime keep its regime‑critic voices offline.

In Africa, the memo highlights deals with several governments that are keen to curb the influence of political activists and independent media. The most cited example is the partnership between the Somali government and a Chinese technology company that supplies a real‑time keyword‑filtering platform. Likewise, the Mexican government’s Ministry of Communications is said to be in discussions with a Chinese vendor about a “dual‑use” product that can be used for both content moderation and “security” purposes.

Export Controls and the Legal Grey Zone

The leak also raises questions about how such technology is regulated in the United States and Canada. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce has, in recent years, added “censorship” and “surveillance” capabilities to its Export‑Administration Regulations (EAR). However, the memo reveals that many of the products sold by Chinese firms are classified under broad categories that can be argued to be “dual‑use” – technology that can serve both commercial and military or surveillance purposes.

“We are in a grey area,” notes Dr. Elena Marquez, a cybersecurity policy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in an interview with The Globe and Mail. “The same software that helps a social‑media company moderate user content can be repurposed by a government to suppress dissent. Export controls are often designed to keep pure weapons out of foreign hands, but it’s hard to delineate the line when the line is a piece of software.”

The leak also points to a concerning trend in which China’s state‑owned enterprises are working in tandem with private companies to deliver customized censorship packages. This blurring of public and private sectors undermines the traditional export‑control frameworks that rely on the clear separation of state and commercial entities.

International Reaction

Washington and Ottawa have both expressed their unease with the findings. In a joint statement released shortly after the leak, the U.S. State Department called for “increased vigilance” and said it would review its export‑control policies. Canadian officials echoed these concerns in an internal memo, highlighting the need for tighter coordination with allies and a more comprehensive approach to regulating “dual‑use” technology.

Civil‑rights groups have also joined the chorus of alarm. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) released a statement calling the export of censorship technology “a threat to global digital rights.” They urged governments to adopt stricter measures to prevent the sale of such tools to repressive regimes and to hold companies accountable for the end‑use of their products.

Why This Matters

The leak underscores a broader, systemic issue: the way that advanced technology can be weaponised to undermine democratic norms. While China’s Great Firewall remains a domestic tool of surveillance, the fact that it can be sold abroad turns it into a “global weapon” that empowers other governments to stifle dissent, censor media, and manipulate public opinion.

Moreover, the leak has implications for the tech industry’s “responsible AI” initiatives. Many companies are touting their AI models as beneficial for content moderation and hate‑speech detection. However, the dual‑use potential highlighted by the documents suggests that AI can be just as easily deployed for mass surveillance when put in the hands of authoritarian actors.

Looking Forward

The leak has prompted calls for an international framework that would regulate the export of censorship technology. Experts argue that, much like the Non‑Proliferation Treaty for nuclear weapons, a global agreement could help establish norms for what constitutes a “censorship technology” and when it should be restricted.

In the meantime, the United States and Canada are reportedly considering tightening their export‑control regimes. The memo’s revelation that Chinese companies are already in the market suggests that a significant portion of the global censorship‑tech supply chain could be reshuffled in the coming years.

The Decibel podcast’s hosts, in their follow‑up episode, warned that the leak is only the tip of the iceberg. They urged listeners to stay alert, reminding them that the technology designed to censor information is no longer confined to a single nation’s borders – it is a growing global export that can shape the political landscapes of countries far beyond China’s immediate reach.

As the world watches, the key question remains: will global powers act swiftly enough to curb the spread of these digital tools, or will the next wave of censorship technology be ready to roll out, leaving civil‑rights defenders scrambling for solutions? The leak may have just set the stage for the next chapter in the battle over free expression in the digital age.