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China Accuses U.S. of Funding Nuclear Research Leak

  //science-technology.news-articles.net/content/2 .. ccuses-u-s-of-funding-nuclear-research-leak.html
  Published in Science and Technology on Wednesday, December 17th 2025 at 7:55 GMT by WTOP News
      Locale: District of Columbia, UNITED STATES

China’s Stealthy Use of U.S.-Funded Nuclear Research, According to a New Congressional Report

A freshly released congressional report has drawn a stark line between the United States’ efforts to fund nuclear‑research collaborations and China’s clandestine exploitation of those very programs. In a dramatic exposé published by WTOP‑News on December 12, 2025, the report claims that China has systematically siphoned off data, designs, and technical knowledge from U.S. research institutions that were supported through federal grants, contracts, and collaborative grants. The allegations raise serious questions about national security, intellectual‑property protection, and the effectiveness of existing export‑control regimes.

The Report’s Core Findings

The report, compiled by a bipartisan committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, focuses on several key incidents that allegedly demonstrate China’s exploitation of U.S. nuclear research:

1. Leakage of Nuclear Reactor Design Details
   The committee cites evidence that a 2023 joint research project at the University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin) produced blueprints for a high‑temperature gas‑cooled reactor (HTGR). These designs were allegedly accessed by Chinese cyber operatives and subsequently integrated into China’s “FutureGen” program, a domestic effort to build next‑generation nuclear power plants.

2. Plagiarism of Advanced Materials Research
   A team of U.S. scientists at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) had published a paper in Nature in 2024 on novel ceramic composites for use in reactor pressure vessels. The report documents how a Chinese company, Zhenghu Engineering, purchased a library of ORNL’s proprietary software, ostensibly for legitimate industrial use, but later was found to have adapted the same material formulations in its own reactor design.

3. Data Harvesting via Academic Conferences
   The committee’s intelligence analysts highlight a pattern of Chinese delegates attending U.S. academic conferences—often under the guise of “research collaboration”—and then transferring data back to Chinese institutions. A 2024 conference in Seattle, for instance, was reportedly infiltrated by a Chinese research team that collected presentations and hand‑written notes from a U.S. nuclear physics lecture.

4. Unauthorized Export of Nuclear Technology Software
   Several U.S. companies that provide nuclear design software have been found to have transferred critical code to Chinese firms. The report points out that the exports in question were made under “dual‑use” licenses that did not include proper technology‑transfer controls, allowing the Chinese firms to reverse‑engineer and improve the software.

Historical Context and Prior Concerns

The article contextualizes the current findings within a broader narrative of U.S.–China competition. According to WTOP, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Science has historically funded international collaborations as a means to advance scientific knowledge and secure a leadership position in emerging technologies. Critics, however, have long warned that such open‑exchange policies create vulnerabilities, especially when engaging with countries that have a track record of industrial espionage.

An earlier 2021 congressional inquiry into “China’s acquisition of advanced manufacturing techniques” had already flagged a handful of incidents involving the theft of semiconductor designs and high‑precision laser technologies. That investigation concluded that the U.S. export‑control system was “too permissive” for sectors with dual‑use potential. The 2025 report can therefore be seen as a continuation—and escalation—of that line of inquiry.

Congressional Reactions and Proposed Measures

The WTOP article reports that members of the committee—spanning both parties—issued a statement calling for “immediate reforms to our export‑control framework and stricter oversight of federally funded research.” The proposed measures include:

• Tightening of the “Dual‑Use Export Control List”
  Expanding the definition of dual‑use technology to explicitly include nuclear‑related software and materials.

• Mandatory Security Audits for Collaborative Grants
  Requiring all joint research contracts to undergo an annual security audit to ensure that intellectual property remains protected.

• Creation of a “National Nuclear Research Security Office”
  An entity tasked with monitoring international collaborations, conducting risk assessments, and coordinating with intelligence agencies.

• Penalties for Non‑Compliance
  The report recommends significant civil and criminal penalties for researchers, institutions, and companies that violate export‑control regulations, even if the violation was inadvertent.

The report’s bipartisan tone is notable. Rep. Sarah Collins (R‑TX) and Rep. Daniel Ortega (D‑CA) both emphasized that the U.S. “must lead, not lag,” in the nuclear arena. They also urged the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to adopt a “zero‑tolerance” stance toward intellectual‑property theft.

China’s Response

In the days following the article’s publication, Chinese officials denied the allegations, calling the report “baseless political maneuvering.” The Ministry of Science and Technology issued a statement that U.S. research programs are “open for all” and that China is simply “following the global trend of scientific collaboration.” Beijing has also highlighted that Chinese researchers contribute significantly to U.S. nuclear projects and are co‑authors on numerous high‑impact papers.

However, the WTOP article notes that independent analysts find the Chinese denials less convincing, citing the documented patterns of IP theft in other sectors (e.g., aerospace, semiconductor manufacturing). Some experts suggest that the Chinese government’s dual strategy—promoting “peaceful” scientific exchange while simultaneously engaging in state‑sponsored espionage—makes it difficult to differentiate between legitimate collaboration and covert acquisition.

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Research

If the allegations are correct, the stakes are high. The U.S. has traditionally viewed nuclear technology as a strategic domain for both energy security and defense. China’s potential gain of U.S. nuclear expertise could:

• Accelerate China’s Nuclear Energy Expansion
  Allowing China to deploy more advanced reactors faster, reducing global reliance on U.S. nuclear technology.

• Enable New Weaponization Pathways
  The same advanced materials and reactor designs could, in theory, support the development of new nuclear weapons or delivery systems.

• Disrupt U.S. Industrial Leadership
  Leading to a loss of competitive advantage for U.S. companies in the global nuclear market.

The WTOP article underscores that the U.S. is now at a crossroads: either continue the open‑exchange model, which may provide short‑term academic benefits but leaves strategic vulnerabilities, or tighten controls, which could slow scientific progress and reduce the attractiveness of U.S. research for global partners.

Where to Go Next

The article links to several primary sources that provide deeper insight:

• Congressional Report PDF – [Link]
  The full, 35‑page bipartisan report is available for download and includes detailed case studies, data, and proposed policy changes.

• DOE Office of Science – International Collaboration Guidelines – [Link]
  Offers the current framework that the U.S. uses to govern joint research projects.

• NNSA Nuclear Security Administration – Export Controls – [Link]
  Explains the existing export‑control regime and recent updates.

• Global Nuclear Energy Institute (GNEI) – China’s Nuclear Projects – [Link]
  Provides background on China’s domestic nuclear program and recent milestones.

Readers who wish to follow the debate should keep an eye on the forthcoming hearing scheduled for January 2026, where both the DOE and NNSA will present testimony on how they plan to address the vulnerabilities highlighted in the report.

Final Thoughts

The WTOP article’s exposé on China’s alleged exploitation of U.S. nuclear research underscores a growing tension in the global research ecosystem. Balancing the ideals of open scientific collaboration with the practical realities of national security is no easy task. The next few months will be critical as policymakers debate whether the United States can maintain its position as a leader in nuclear technology without opening the door to competitors who can reverse‑engineer and benefit from its best‑in‑class research. The outcome will shape not only the future of nuclear power in the United States but also the broader geopolitical landscape in which nuclear technology serves as both a source of energy and a strategic weapon.