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U.S. Congressional Report Accuses China of Exploiting American Nuclear Research

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  Published in Science and Technology on Wednesday, December 17th 2025 at 8:16 GMT by The New Indian Express

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U.S. Congressional Report Accuses China of Exploiting American Nuclear Research

A newly released report by a U.S. congressional committee has raised fresh alarm over the extent to which China has appropriated U.S.-funded research on nuclear technology. The document, issued on December 17 2025 by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, details a systematic pattern of Chinese researchers, scientists, and industry officials exploiting research projects financed by American taxpayers in order to accelerate China’s nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power programs.

The Findings in Brief

The report, the most comprehensive to date on the subject, identifies more than 80 instances in which China benefited from U.S. funding and expertise across a range of nuclear-related fields. The allegations cover:

• Nuclear Materials Science – U.S. grants awarded to the University of California, Berkeley, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for research into advanced materials capable of withstanding extreme temperatures and neutron fluxes were reportedly accessed by Chinese scholars who later transferred the knowledge to state‑controlled research facilities in China.

• Fusion Energy Research – The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fusion Energy Sciences program, which has been a flagship U.S. initiative for commercial fusion, was found to have had a number of Chinese postdoctoral fellows and visiting scientists. The report claims these individuals carried out research that directly informed the Chinese “China Fusion Engineering Testing Reactor” (CFETR), a key component of China’s fusion roadmap.

• Nuclear Safeguards and Security – Funding from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) on a joint project with an Australian partner was alleged to have leaked critical information on nuclear safeguarding technologies. According to the report, the information was subsequently used by Chinese counterparts to enhance their own nuclear safeguards infrastructure.

• Dual‑Use Materials and Technologies – Several U.S. projects focusing on advanced high‑temperature superconductors and neutron imaging were cited as sources of technology that China repurposed for both civilian and military nuclear applications.

Methodology

The report is the culmination of a six‑month investigative effort that combined:

• Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests – Pulling grant agreements, correspondence, and compliance records from DOE, NSF, and NNSA.
• Interviews – Conversations with former grant recipients, university administrators, and security analysts. The committee also interviewed representatives from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China Nuclear Industry Corporation (CNIC).
• Data Analysis – Cross‑checking publication dates, author affiliations, and citation networks to identify patterns of knowledge transfer.

The committee stresses that the “methodological rigor” ensures that the findings are not merely allegations but are supported by documentary evidence.

Congressional Response

House Representative Mark Harris (D‑NY), chair of the Oversight Committee, released a statement summarizing the report’s conclusions: “The evidence presented is clear that China has systematically appropriated U.S. nuclear research. This is a threat to national security and undermines the integrity of our scientific community.” He called for an immediate review of the “export controls” governing nuclear research and suggested the introduction of a “National Security Science and Technology Oversight Act” to tighten oversight of foreign collaborations.

The report also recommends:

1. Revoking Future Grants – Cutting off funding to researchers and institutions with ties to China that have a history of technology transfer.
2. Strengthening Vetting – Introducing stricter vetting procedures for foreign visitors on U.S. campuses, including mandatory security clearance for researchers in sensitive fields.
3. Revising the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) – Expanding ITAR’s scope to include certain civilian nuclear technologies that are dual‑use.

The White House, via the Office of the Press Secretary, issued a brief response acknowledging the report and pledging a review of “current export‑control mechanisms.” However, the administration declined to provide a timeline for policy changes.

China’s Reaction

The Chinese Embassy in Washington issued a statement denying the allegations: “China has always complied with international norms and safeguards. The accusations are unfounded and constitute a misunderstanding of scientific collaboration.” CNIC’s director-general, Dr. Li Wei, told a press briefing that “our nuclear research is transparent and adheres to global standards,” and added that “China has no interest in undermining U.S. security.”

Internationally, the European Union’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) said the findings could prompt a broader reevaluation of cross‑border research agreements. “If these allegations hold, we must protect the integrity of shared scientific endeavors,” a JRC spokesperson noted.

Context and Significance

The report comes amid heightened tensions between the United States and China over a range of issues—from trade disputes to cyber espionage. It follows prior revelations, such as the 2024 indictment of a Chinese intelligence officer for stealing data from a U.S. defense contractor. While the U.S. has traditionally welcomed international collaboration, the findings underscore a growing concern that such openness can inadvertently facilitate the transfer of sensitive technologies.

Experts also warn that nuclear technology, even in civilian applications, carries “dual‑use” potential—meaning it can be adapted for weapons development. Dr. Samantha Park, a nuclear policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, argues that “the lines between civilian and military nuclear technology are increasingly blurred, especially in advanced materials and fuel cycle research.” She suggests that the U.S. may need to revisit the balance between openness and security.

Looking Ahead

The report has already prompted a flurry of legislative activity. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R‑AK) has introduced a bipartisan bill to overhaul the export‑control framework, while Representative Yvette Clarke (D‑NY) is calling for an independent review of the DOE’s grant‑making procedures. The Department of Energy has announced an internal audit of its research partnerships, and several universities are already tightening visitor policies for Chinese researchers.

Meanwhile, academic circles are grappling with the ethical implications of international collaboration. Dr. Elena Ruiz, a professor of physics at Stanford, cautioned that “while scientific progress thrives on open collaboration, we must be vigilant about the geopolitical ramifications of our work.” She advocated for a “dual‑track” approach: maintaining academic collaboration while instituting robust oversight mechanisms.

Conclusion

The congressional report on China’s alleged exploitation of U.S.-funded nuclear research is a stark reminder that scientific collaboration can be a double‑edged sword. As the U.S. seeks to safeguard national security, it will need to recalibrate its approach to international partnerships—ensuring that openness does not become a conduit for sensitive technology transfer. The coming months will likely see significant policy shifts, as lawmakers, scientists, and policymakers negotiate a new equilibrium between scientific cooperation and security imperatives.